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PART I:  INTRODUCTION 
 The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA), signed into law on March 23, 
2010, brought sweeping reforms to the United States health care delivery system.  Among its many 
changes, the legislation provides an unprecedented emphasis on preventive care and wellness 
initiatives.  One of these initiatives permits employers to offer worksite wellness programs to their 
employees and dependents, using incentives of up to 30 percent – and in some cases as high as 50 
percent – of the cost of their health insurance benefits to induce participants to reach certain health 
outcomes or biometric standards.  With a projected annual cost of $6,500 for single coverage when 
the law becomes effective in 2014, these incentives may be valued from $1,950 to $3,250.   
 Such significant incentives have raised concern among some and gained praise from others.  
There is concern that “linking premiums and cost-sharing to health status will make the cost of 
insurance much higher for the very people who need health care most. … Research has shown that 
people with conditions like cancer, diabetes and heart disease are much less able to treat and 
manage their condition when their insurance costs are high.”1  In contrast, business groups and 
industry leaders tout workplace wellness programs (WWPs) as one of the most effective ways to 
combat the rising cost of health insurance: “Employers of all sizes have embraced wellness-based 
incentives to help control costs, and companies are now looking at ways to design and optimize 
their programs to maximize their positive impact on health for both the organization and 
employees.”2 
 Before looking more closely at the legal implications of implementing a WWP that uses 
incentives to the full extent permitted under the ACA,  it may be instructive to present the history of 
the legislation that permits these significant incentives.  Known as the “Safeway Amendment,” the 
wellness incentive provisions of the ACA were added under a Senate amendment based in large 
part on published statements of Steven Burd, CEO of Safeway, Inc.  In an opinion piece in the June 
12, 2009 Wall Street Journal, Mr. Burd claimed:   
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“The key to achieving these savings is health-care plans that reward healthy behavior. As a 
self-insured employer, Safeway designed just such a plan in 2005 and has made continuous 
improvements each year. The results have been remarkable. During this four-year period, 
we have kept our per capita health-care costs flat (that includes both the employee and the 
employer portion), while most American companies' costs have increased 38% over the 
same four years.”3  
  
 This “success story” was picked up by President Obama and Senators of both parties in 
support of the amendment to the ACA permitting the increased incentives.  Sadly, more careful 
investigation revealed that the claims just weren’t true.  Instead, the savings noted by Mr. Burd 
were realized as a result of a 2006 overhaul of the Safeway employee health plan that shifted more 
costs to employees, thus bringing down company costs.  But the wellness program that Mr. Burd 
referenced was not implemented until 2009:  
[A] review of Safeway documents and interviews with company officials show that the 
company did not keep health-care costs flat for four years. Those costs did drop in 2006 -- 
by 12.5 percent. That was when the company overhauled its benefits, according to Safeway 
Senior Vice President Ken Shachmut. 
The decline did not have anything to do with tying employees' premiums to test results. 
That element of Safeway's benefits plan was not implemented until 2009, Shachmut said. 
After the 2006 drop, costs resumed their climb, he said. 
Even as Burd claimed last year to have held costs flat, Safeway was forecasting that per 
capita expenses for its employees would rise by 8.5 percent in 2009. According to a survey 
of 1,700 health plans by the benefits consultant Hewitt Associates, the average increase 
nationally was 6.1 percent.4 
 It is ironic - but perhaps fitting as well - that the inspiration for this legislation arose out of a 
disputed interpretation of the cost impact of a worksite wellness program: as discussed in detail 
below, the data concerning the cost-savings to be gained under these programs is mixed, at best, 
and the legality of an employer’s WWP may well depend in part on being able to justify that the 
incentives offered to employees under these programs bear some reasonable relationship to those 
savings.  These requirements are not imposed by the ACA itself – indeed, the ACA specifically denies 
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that such a cost justification is necessary – but arise out of the myriad of other federal employment 
laws impacting ESHI plans.   
 Part II of this paper analyzes those laws and attempts to bring some order to the conflicting 
requirements. (Although, as one legal scholar has noted, “Undertaking to place all the[se] laws into 
some harmonious and analytically coherent framework is likely a futile effort.”)5  Part III 
summarizes the health research that may support or restrict various WWP designs in light of these 
requirements.  Part IV synthesizes Parts II and III in an attempt to offer a practical approach to 
WWPs in order to comply with the applicable federal employment laws. 
 Before turning to the legal analysis in Part II, there are two terms used extensively in this 
paper that require definition.  The first is “incentives.” As used in this paper, an incentive is a 
monetary or other inducement of financial value designed to encourage changes in behavior that 
result in a desired health outcome. The inducement can be negative or positive – a penalty or 
reward.  Neither the ACA provisions nor the precursor statute distinguish between the two in 
defining the requirements for incentives, so the term is used accordingly in this paper to apply 
equally to negative and positive inducements.  Where a distinction between negative and positive is 
necessary for clarity, the terms “penalty” and “reward” will be used. 
 The second phrase used frequently herein is “benefit levels.”  This phrase is used to describe 
the overall effect of incentives applied to a WWP or employer-sponsored health insurance (ESHI) 
plan.  Incentives may be used alone or in combination to reduce or increase an employee’s levels of 
required premium payments, deductibles, copayments and coinsurance (the percentage of covered 
costs paid by the plan). All of these will impact the value of an employee’s coverage and overall 
healthcare costs, and I use the phrase “benefit levels” to refer to the cumulative effect of incentives. 
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 Finally, many employers offer their WWP incentives to dependents of employees as well.  
For simplicity, the discussion below is restricted to employee coverage only, but the same concepts 
and restrictions will apply equally to dependent coverage. 
 
PART II:  LEGAL ANALYSIS  
 Overview.  This Part II analyzes the application of six distinct federal employment 
discrimination statutes that bear on the design and implementation of WWPs.  It is important to 
note at the outset that each of these laws has as its main purpose the protection of employees from 
workplace discrimination in one form or another.  This protection extends to an employer’s 
compensation and fringe benefit practices, and the application of incentives offered through a WWP 
will result in differential compensation and/or benefit levels for employees who qualify for the 
incentive.  The resulting disparity in benefit levels may be considered discriminatory and will be 
permitted – if at all – only as an exception to each statute’s prohibition on employment 
discrimination. The fact that one of these statutes may permit a particular feature of a WWP does 
not exonerate it if the same feature does not meet the requirements for an exception from another 
statute.  Thus, every feature of a WWP must meet all of the statutory requirements. 
 The analysis is further complicated by the fact that each statute protects a different group of 
employees.  Protection from discrimination is afforded under the various laws on the basis of race, 
national origin, religion, sex, age, disability, health status and information about an individual’s 
genetic health risks.  The protected classification is typically referred to as the “protected group,” 
and any given employee may fall into multiple protected groups. 
 To bring some sense to all of this, each statute is analyzed below with a view to (1) 
identifying the protected group; (2) describing the nature of the prohibited discrimination; and (3) 
defining the extent to which exceptions under the statute permit disparate benefit levels. 
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 Before addressing these laws individually, it should be noted that there are other federal 
and state laws that will govern the design and implementation of a WWP but which are outside the 
scope of this paper.  These include, among others, the federal Internal Revenue Code, which 
imposes unfavorable tax treatment on employers and highly compensated employees if the WWP 
and associated ESHI impermissibly discriminate against less highly compensated employees.  The 
tax code, however, does not provide affirmative protection to individuals or groups of employees.  
That is, employees cannot sue to enforce these provisions, and employers can choose to 
discriminate in favor of highly compensated employees if they are willing to accept the tax 
consequences.  
 Finally, it should also be noted that each of these federal statutes includes provisions 
designed to protect the confidentiality of the medical information received in connection with 
wellness programs. It is outside the scope of this paper to discuss each of these provisions 
separately, but the collective impact of all such provisions results in a blanket prohibition on 
sharing individually identifiable information with the employer.  This information can only be 
provided to the employer in aggregate form. 
 Federal Employment Nondiscrimination Laws.  This analysis of the applicable statutes 
begins with a review of the Health Insurance Portability and Protection Act (HIPAA), which serves 
as the precursor to the ACA provisions regarding WWP incentives.  Changes made to the HIPAA 
rules by the ACA are discussed next.  Following that analysis, each of the other four statutes is 







The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 19966 (HIPAA) prohibits employer-
sponsored health insurance (ESHI) from discriminating against employees (and their covered 
dependents) on the basis of health factors.7  A limited exception to this prohibition allows a health 
plan to distinguish on the basis of health status to the extent the plan is part of a “bona fide wellness 
program” designed to promote health or prevent disease.8 The wellness program provisions in the 
ACA are essentially a statutory codification of the regulatory standards developed by the U.S. 
Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services and Treasury (collectively, the “Departments”) 
in their joint capacity as the regulatory agencies responsible for interpreting HIPAA.   
 Under their collective regulatory authority, the Departments issued final regulations in 
20069 that established the guidelines for such bona fide wellness programs under HIPAA.  These 
regulations distinguished between (1) participatory wellness programs, which either (a) offered 
program incentives on the basis of participation alone (and not on achievement of a particular 
health factor) or (b) did not offer incentives at all; and (2) outcomes-based programs that provide 
an incentive for meeting one or more health standards.   
 Participatory programs. The HIPAA regulations established only minimal 
requirements for participatory programs.  Compliance with the statute’s non-discrimination 
requirements were deemed met if the program was made available to all similarly situated 
individuals on the basis of “bona fide employment classifications based on the employer’s usual 
business practices,” and not on the basis of health factors.10  These rules would permit an employer, 
HEALTH INSURANCE PORTABILITY AND PROTECTION ACT (HIPAA) 
SUMMARY OF KEY NONDISCRIMINATION PROVISIONS: HIPAA prohibits an employer from 
discriminating against employees in its ESHI plan eligibility or cost sharing provisions on the 
basis of a “health factor,” which includes factors such as pre-existing conditions, physical or 
mental health status, and medical history. An exception to this general prohibition permits the 
employer to offer incentives of up to 20 percent of the cost of ESHI coverage to induce 
employees to participate in a bona fide wellness program that is reasonably designed to 
promote health or prevent disease. 
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for example, to subsidize gym memberships or offer smoking cessation programs for specified 
groups of employees on the basis of work location, classification as management vs. hourly 
workers, or similar distinctions.  It would not be permissible to limit availability of the benefit on 
the basis of BMI, smoking status or other health factors.  The regulations contained no 
requirements based on program content, reasonableness or evidence that the program was 
designed to promote health or prevent disease. 
 Programs based on meeting health standards.  For programs that condition receipt of an 
incentive on meeting one or more health standards, the HIPAA regulations require the following 
conditions: 
1. Size of Incentive. The total incentive for all such wellness programs offered by the employer 
may not exceed 20 percent of the total cost of coverage under the plan. 
2. Reasonable Design. The program must be reasonably designed to promote health or 
prevent disease.  This standard requires the program to have a “reasonable chance” of 
improving health or preventing disease, it must not be overly burdensome, it must not be a 
subterfuge for discrimination on the basis of health status, and it must not be “highly 
suspect” in method. 
3. Frequency of Opportunity to Qualify. The program must give eligible individuals an 
opportunity to qualify for the incentive at least once per year. 
4. Uniform Availability with Reasonable Alternative Standards. The incentive must be 
available to all similarly situated individuals.  In addition, a reasonable alternative standard 
must be available to individuals for whom, during the period for which the incentive is 
available, it is unreasonably difficult due to a medical condition to satisfy, or for whom it 
would be medically inadvisable to attempt to satisfy, the applicable health factor standard. 
For example, if an incentive is available for employees with a normal BMI, those who exceed 
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this standard may be able to qualify for the same incentive if they exercise for 30 minutes, 5 
times per week.11 
 Like the standards for participatory programs, there are no substantive requirements for 
program content.  Indeed, the preamble to the final regulations makes it quite clear that there is no 
requirement for programs to meet evidence-based guidelines: 
The “reasonably designed” requirement is intended to be an easy standard to satisfy.  To 
make this clear, the final regulations have added language providing that if a program has a 
reasonable chance of improving the health of participants and it is not overly burdensome, 
is not a subterfuge for discriminating based on a health factor and is not highly suspect in 
the method chosen to promote health or prevent disease, it satisfies this standard.  There 
does not need to be a scientific record that the method promotes wellness to satisfy this 
standard. (Emphasis added.)12 





 The ACA statutory language changed very little of the standards established under the 
HIPAA regulations.  It did, however, enlarge the permissible incentive to a maximum of 30 percent 
of the cost of coverage under the ESHI plan. In addition, the statute authorizes the Departments to 
permit by regulation an increase in this limit to 50 percent of the cost of coverage. Regulations 
interpreting the ACA provisions were proposed in November 2012 (Proposed Regulations).13  
 The proposed regulations issued by the Departments closely follow the standards 
established under HIPAA.  They implement the increased incentive of 30 percent as permitted by 
the statute and provide some clarification of the prior standards but - with one exception – make no 
PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT (ACA) 
KEY NONDISCRIMINATION PROVISIONS:  The ACA extends the HIPAA prohibition against 
discrimination on the basis of health factors to additional insurance markets.  It also codifies the 
HIPAA standards for WWPs described above and increases the permissible level of incentives to 
up to 30 percent of the cost of ESHI coverage, with an alternate level of up to 50 percent of the 
cost of ESHI coverage in the case of programs designed to induce employees to cease or reduce 
tobacco use. 
 10 
significant changes to the HIPAA regulations.  Drawing on their statutory authority to increase the 
level of incentives up to a maximum of 50 percent of the cost of coverage, the Proposed Regulations 
would permit an incentive of 50 percent for standards-based programs that target the reduction or 
prevention of tobacco use.    
 Participatory Programs.  The Proposed Regulations make it clear that participatory 
programs which do not require participants to meet a health-based standard are not subject to the 
limits and requirements imposed on standards-based programs. As under HIPAA, these programs 
must continue to be made available to all similarly situated employees. 
 Programs based on meeting health standards. The Proposed Regulations modify the HIPAA 
standards for these programs as follows: 
1. Size of Incentive. As noted above, the total permissible incentive for standard-based 
wellness programs has been increased to 30 percent.  Programs targeting tobacco use may 
provide an incentive of up to 50 percent of the total cost of an individual’s coverage.  Note 
that these limits are cumulative: the incentive structure of all of an employer’s wellness 
programs, taken together, may not total more than 30 percent (or 50 percent if the 
programs include a tobacco use element.) 
2. Reasonable Design. The Proposed Regulations reiterate the standard established under 
HIPAA. That is, the program must have a “reasonable chance” of improving health or 
preventing disease, it must not be overly burdensome, it must not be a subterfuge for 
discrimination on the basis of health status, and it must not be “highly suspect” in method.  
Although the Proposed Regulations do not go so far as to require that a program be 
evidence-based, they do invite comments on whether evidence- or practice-based standards 
should be required.    
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3. Frequency of Opportunity to Qualify. This standard was not changed: the program must 
give eligible individuals an opportunity to qualify for the incentive at least once per year. 
4. Uniform Availability with Reasonable Alternative Standards. While the Proposed 
Regulations do not change this requirement, the preamble provides some clarification of the 
rules. As noted previously, an incentive must be available to all similarly situated 
individuals.  This includes the requirement that a reasonable alternative standard must be 
available to individuals for whom medical conditions make it unreasonably difficult or 
inadvisable to attempt to satisfy the health standard on which the incentive is based. The 
Proposed Regulations provide some guidance on these “reasonable alternatives”: 
 A wellness program may require medical certification that a reasonable alternative is 
necessary due to an individual’s medical condition. 
 If a wellness plan requires a participant to complete a health educational program, the 
plan must provide the required program and must pay any program fees. 
 If a wellness plan requires a participant to complete a diet program, the plan must pay 
program fees but is not required to pay for the cost of the food. 
 If the wellness plan requires compliance with the recommendations of a health care 
provider engaged by the plan or the employer, the plan must accommodate the 
recommendations of the individual’s physician if he or she states that the plan-provided 
recommendations are not medically appropriate for that individual.  It is not clear 
whether the plan must pay for any medical supplies and services furnished in 
accordance with the health care provider’s recommendations. If those supplies and 
services are a covered benefit under the wellness plan or the employer’s ESHI, they can 
be provided in accordance with plan terms (which may require the individual to pay 
some part of the cost), but it is not clear whether it would be considered reasonable for 
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a wellness plan to require an individual to follow (and pay for) recommended supplies 
and services that are not covered by either the wellness or ESHI plan. 
In summary, the Proposed Regulations under ACA closely follow the standards established 
under HIPAA.  The only substantive change from prior law is the increase in the permissible 
incentives to 30, and in some cases, 50 percent of the cost of ESHI.  These limits apply only to 
programs that condition receipt of the incentive on achievement of a defined health outcome; 
programs based only on participation are not subject to any such limits.  However, as discussed in 
the following sections, four other federal laws may put additional limits on the use of incentives in 
wellness programs. 




 The Civil Rights Act of 1964 protects against discrimination on the basis of sex, race, 
religion and national origin: Title VII of that Act prohibits discrimination against these protected 
classes in the employment context, which includes the “compensation, terms, conditions or 
privileges of employment.”14  Benefits under the employer’s ESHI plan are a fringe benefit of 
employment, and as such are subject to the Title VII protections.    
 Title VII has been interpreted by the courts to prohibit not just different treatment explicitly 
or intentionally based on one of the protected classifications, but also on the grounds of disparate 
impact.15  If a member of a protected class can show that a facially neutral policy falls more harshly 
TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (TITLE VII) 
KEY NONDISCRIMINATION PROVISIONS: Title VII prohibits disparate treatment in benefit levels 
on the basis of race, sex or ethnic origin (that is, benefit levels that are specifically based on race, 
sex or national origin). There is no exception for cost-justified disparities. Title VII also prohibits 
disparate impact (that is, benefit levels that are not specifically based on race, sex or national 
origin, but which have disparate impact on members of the protected group). Application of this 
rule in the context of WWP incentives is not clear.  If prohibited discrimination is found in a case 
of disparate impact, it is not clear whether an exception exists for cost-justified disparities in 
benefit levels.   
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on the protected group, the policy will be considered in violation of the law.  However, the 
application of this rule in the context of disparate benefit levels under ESHI is highly nuanced.   
  It is common for ESHI plans to exclude particular conditions from coverage.  Common 
examples include exclusions for cosmetic surgery, treatments for obesity and contraceptive 
treatments.  Where these exclusions relate to pregnancy, the exclusions are unlawful under Title 
VII.  Other exclusions related to reproductive health - an area closely linked to sex-based 
distinctions – are not so clearly prohibited. 
 The history of the prohibition on pregnancy-based exclusions highlights the reluctance the 
courts have shown to extend protection to disparate benefits on the basis of sex.  In an early case, 
the Supreme Court ruled that an exclusion of benefits for pregnancy was not discriminatory on the 
basis of sex.16  This decision was rapidly overruled by Congressional action which amended Title VII 
to include the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA).  The PDA explicitly establishes that benefit 
distinctions based on pregnancy are considered to be a violation of Title VII’s prohibition on 
gender-based discrimination since only women can get pregnant.17   
 However, challenges brought against benefit exclusions for reproductive health conditions 
other than pregnancy have not been as successful.   Courts have ruled that benefit exclusions 
related to reproductive processes such as contraception and infertility are not necessarily 
discriminatory, as these functions affect men as well.  Under general Title VII concepts, a showing 
by plaintiffs of the disparate impact of these exclusions on women should be sufficient to establish a 
prima facie case, but to date such cases have generally been dismissed for failure to state a cause of 
action.18  In contrast, an employee who was fired for missing work to undergo infertility treatments 
was found to have a cause of action under Title VII.  The court reasoned that, although infertility 
affects both men and women, only women will need to take time off from work to receive the 
treatments; thus the employer’s action was discriminatory.19  So, while a disparate impact claim 
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based on disparate benefit levels should theoretically be available upon an adequate showing of 
evidence, the courts have shown reluctance in granting relief on this basis.20 
 Outside of the ESHI context, it is well established that Title VII prohibits employers from 
establishing job qualification criteria that have a disparate impact on a protected group.  Unless the 
employer can show that those criteria are “job-related for the position in question and consistent 
with business necessity,”21 qualification criteria with a disparate impact will be invalidated.  Thus 
physical fitness and weight criteria that fall disproportionately on a protected group –typically 
along gender lines- are not permitted when they serve to limit or eliminate candidates for job hiring 
or promotion. 
 As noted in more detail in Part III, many of the biometric standards established under 
WWPs show disparities among racial, ethnic and gender lines.  Given the reluctance of courts to 
find a Title VII violation in the context of ESHI plans, it is difficult to predict whether the use of such 
biometric standards as qualification criteria for incentives would violate Title VII if they impact a 
protected group in a disproportionate manner. 
   Unlike the Americans with Disabilities Act and Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 
discussed below, if a Title VII violation is found, an employer generally may not defend its actions 
on the basis of cost justification.  At least in the case of a facially discriminatory benefit structure 
(that is, disparate treatment), this is an absolute prohibition: an employer may not justify a 
discriminatory health benefits structure on the grounds that the distinctions are necessary due to 
the increased cost of providing benefits for a particular racial, ethnic or sex-based condition. 22  
There is some indication that the courts would be willing to acknowledge a cost justification 
defense in the case of a benefit structure with discriminate impact, however.23 
 15 
 Given the uncertainty of the application of Title VII in the context of ESHI in general and 
WWPs in particular, employers are urged to use caution in developing WWP standards that may 





 The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, as amended by the Americans with Disabilities 
Amendment Act of 2008 (the ADAAA)(collectively, the  ADA)24 protects an employee from 
discrimination by the employer on the basis of the employee’s own disability or the disability of his 
or her family members.  For purposes of applying the law, a disability is defined as an impairment 
that substantially limits one or more life activities.  A person with the impairment is protected 
under the statute if, with a reasonable accommodation of the limiting effects of the impairment, he 
or she can perform the essential functions of the job.   
During the nearly 20-year history of the ADA prior to the ADAAA, the issue of what 
constituted an “impairment” covered by the statute was heavily litigated.  In response to perceived 
overly restrictive definitions of the term by the courts, the ADAAA was enacted to make it easier for 
individuals to establish the existence of a disability.25  Under the new definitions of “impairment” 
and the “life activities” that must be impaired in order to show a disability, virtually all chronic 
diseases may be considered disabilities.  Diabetes and obesity were rarely found to be disabilities 
under the ADA prior to its amendment by the ADAAA, but some of the first court decisions issued 
after the effective date of the ADAAA have ruled both diabetes and obesity can be disabilities within 
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT (ADA) 
KEY NONDISCRIMINATION PROVISIONS: The ADA prohibits employers from discriminating on 
the basis of disability. Benefit levels may not discriminate against individuals on the basis of 
disability unless the benefit plan is (1) not a subterfuge to evade the purposes of the ADA 
and/or (2) the disability-based distinction is justifiable on the basis of underwriting risks and 
classifications. 
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the meaning of the ADA.26 This broadened definition will impact the degree to which the ADA will 
affect worksite wellness programs and ESHI. 
In particular, two provisions of the ADA relate to worksite wellness programs and ESHI.  
The first is a provision designed to preempt employer discrimination by limiting the extent of the 
employer’s access to the employee’s medical information.  The second prohibits employers from 
discriminating against disabled employees (and/or their disabled dependents) under the terms of 
their ESHI plans. 
Medical Examinations.  The first of these provisions generally prohibits the employer from 
requiring any sort of medical examination of employees unless the examination is job-related and 
consistent with business necessity.27 However, the employer may “conduct voluntary medical 
examinations, including voluntary medical histories, which are part of an employee health program 
available to employees at that work site.”28  The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC), which has enforcement and regulatory authority under the ADA, has indicated that 
wellness program inquiries about medical histories and biometric screenings to determine whether 
a health standard has been reached are medical examinations within the meaning of this provision, 
and thus must be voluntary. 
Many worksite wellness programs feature health risk assessments (HRAs), and many 
employers encourage their employees to complete the assessment on an annual basis.  Employers 
commonly provide financial and other incentives as an inducement to do so.  The EEOC has 
objected to this practice in some cases, arguing that the examination is not “voluntary,” as required 
by the statute, if the incentive is too valuable.  In opinion letters issued by EEOC Office of Legal 
Counsel to employers requesting guidance, the agency has indicated that it would be a violation of 
the ADA to make (1) eligibility to participate under the employer’s ESHI,29 or (2) receipt of cash 
reimbursement for medical expenses (in an undisclosed amount) from a health reimbursement 
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account,30 contingent upon completion of a health risk assessment.  It appears that the EEOC took 
the position at one point that an incentive of up to 20 percent of the cost of coverage under the ESHI 
– that is, the permissible incentive then permitted under HIPAA – would not violate the ADA.  
However, the EEOC later withdrew the opinion letter that established this position and replaced it 
with a letter that was silent on this issue, citing as the reason for its removal the fact that the agency 
had not specifically been asked to establish the upper limits on incentives.31  In its most recent 
guidance – in the form of a non-binding, informal discussion letter issued by the EEOC Office of 
Legal Counsel – the agency stated that a wellness program that includes “disability-related inquiries 
(such as questions about current health status asked as part of a health risk assessment) or medical 
examinations (such as blood pressure and cholesterol screening to determine whether an employee 
has achieved certain health outcomes)” are not “voluntary” if the employer requires participation 
or “penalizes employees who do not participate.”32  
The EEOC has indicated that it is considering the extent to which an employer may offer 
incentives to participate in wellness programs.  Until further guidance is issued, it appears that it 
may not be permitted under the ADA to offer incentives in the form of (1) incentives of such value 
that to decline participation in a wellness program could not be considered “voluntary,” or (2) 
penalties (possibly at any level) for refusing to participate.  It should be noted that this limitation 
would apply to all employees – not just those deemed to be disabled under the ADA. 
Discriminatory ESHI Plans.  The second provision of the ADA that impacts the legality of 
employer-sponsored wellness programs is one that generally prohibits employers from 
discriminating on the basis of disability with respect to “employee compensation, ... and other 
terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.”33  ESHI is considered to be a fringe benefit and, 
under this statutory language, it would be impermissible for an ESHI plan to discriminate on the 
basis of disability.34  This provision clearly limits an employer’s ability to exclude a disabled worker 
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from health insurance coverage or charge him more for the coverage just because the employee is 
“disabled.”  The analysis becomes more complex when one considers the extent to which a plan can 
deny benefits or charge higher rates based on a particular medical condition. It is not so clear 
whether a WWP that reduces an employee’s health insurance premiums by 30 percent for 
achieving certain health standards – such as a “normal” BMI or blood pressure reading – would be 
prohibited.  
On the one hand, such a standard would appear to be discriminatory when applied to an 
employee who is deemed to be disabled because of obesity or hypertension.  However, an exception 
to the general prohibition on discriminatory fringe benefit plans provides that “the terms of a bona 
fide benefit plan that are based on underwriting risks, classifying risks, or administering such risks 
that are based on or not inconsistent with State law” are not considered to violate the terms of the 
ADA, provided that the plan is “not used as a subterfuge to evade the purposes of [the ADA].”35  The 
use of increased premiums to address higher-cost health risks is the classic definition of an 
“underwriting risk,” so the WWP use of higher premiums as an incentive to reach a healthier 
standard may in fact come within the exception to the general rule.  Under the recently enacted 
ACA, however, it is no longer permissible to take health status (other than age and smoking) into 
account for purposes of underwriting risks. 
The EEOC has never issued regulations defining the extent of this ADA exception, although it 
published informal guidance in 1993 that outlined a test for determining whether or not plan 
exclusions would violate the ADA.36  The first step in the test requires a determination that the 
benefit exclusion is a “disability-based distinction.”  By way of example, the EEOC contrasted a 
hypothetical plan that excludes coverage for blood transfusions with one that excludes treatment 
for hemophilia.  The latter would be an impermissible disability-based distinction while the former 
would not – even though the effect of the exclusion would be more detrimental to someone with 
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hemophilia.  If the exclusion is a disability-based distinction, then the plan will be found to have 
violated the ADA if the exclusion results in "disability-based disparate treatment that is not justified 
by the risks or costs associated with the disability."37  
The new, broader definition of disability under the ADA may make it difficult to apply this 
guidance.  Since the ADAAA defines a disability to include nearly any chronic disease – even if the 
disease is fully controlled by medical or other intervention - the difficulty in establishing the limits 
of plan liability without making “disability-based” distinctions is enormous.  Notably, the EEOC has 
indicated that this guidance is under review because of these significant changes made by the 
ADAAA.   
It is important to note that the EEOC requirement to provide a cost-justification for 
disability-based plan exclusions has received little support in court.  In decisions rendered prior to 
the ADAAA, the courts gave short shrift to the EEOC’s interpretation and focused instead on 
whether purportedly discriminatory provisions were a “subterfuge” to evade the purposes of the 
ADA.  Based on a prior decision of the Supreme Court interpreting the same “subterfuge” language 
in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (discussed in more detail below) to mean a deliberate 
attempt to avoid the prohibited discrimination, the courts have rejected claims of disability 
discrimination if the employer can show that the contested plan exclusion pre-dates passage of the 
ADA.38  It is not clear how the subsequent passage of the ADAAA and ACA may impact future court 
decisions.  While the ACA provisions do not supersede the ADA, an employer could plausibly argue 
that any program intended to comply with the ACA Proposed Regulations (which require that 
wellness programs be “not overly burdensome [and] not a subterfuge for discriminating based on a 
health factor”)39 could not be a subterfuge to avoid the ADA. 
In the only case to date to address the application of the ADA to wellness programs in 
particular, the court addressed the permissibility of employer-provided incentives for employees to 
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complete a health risk assessment.  In that case, the employer’s wellness program provided that an 
employee’s biweekly paychecks would be reduced by 20 dollars if the employee did not complete 
an HRA required under the wellness program.   An employee brought suit claiming that this 
violated the ADA prohibition on involuntary medical examinations.  The court rejected this 
argument and found that the practice was permissible as a bona fide health plan and that the 
surcharge was legitimately based on  “underwriting risks, classifying risks or administering such 
risks.”40  The court did not engage in the required EEOC analysis that the penalty be justified by the 
risks or costs associated with it.  It was enough that collecting information about the health of 
covered employees was necessary for  
underwriting and classifying risks on a macroscopic level so [the employer] may form 
economically sound benefits plans for the future.  Furthermore, the wellness program is an 
initiative designed to mitigate risks.  It is based on the theory that encouraging employees 
to get involved in their own healthcare leads to a more healthy population that costs less to 
insure.  In other words, the program is based on underwriting, classifying and 
administering risks because its ultimate goal is to sponsor insurance plans that maintain or 
lower its participant’s premiums.41 
The employee benefit community has applauded this decision because it sidesteps the 
EEOC’s apparent disapproval of incentive-based HRAs as involuntary medical examinations.  
However, this may be a pyrrhic victory. While this court approved the use of incentives as being in 
accordance with the ADA’s “bona fide” plan exception, it was based on satisfaction of the 
requirement that the incentive met the “underwriting risks” criteria. However, the incentive at 
issue was a penalty of 20 dollars per biweekly paycheck, or $520 dollars per year.  While this court 
did not demand a showing that the use of the health risk assessment would in fact lower the ESHI 
premiums, an employer that plans to impose the full 30 or 50 percent penalty permitted under the 
ACA  may find it far more difficult to prove that the penalty is justified on the basis of “underwriting 





 The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as amended (ADEA), protects workers 
older than the age of 40 from employment discrimination on the basis of age.  Like Title VII and the 
ADA, this includes a prohibition on discrimination in compensation and fringe benefits such as 
ESHI.  And, like the ADA, there was an exception in the ADEA for bona fide employee benefit plans 
that are not a “subterfuge” to evade the purposes of the Act.  In fact, the ADA exception for bona fide 
benefit plans and the qualification to the exception for plans that are a subterfuge was patterned 
after the ADEA language.  The Proposed Regulations under the ACA use the same language.  This is 
significant, because the subterfuge provision of the ADEA has a life of its own. 
 As originally enacted, the ADEA had the bona fide benefit plan and subterfuge provisions 
noted above.  The EEOC interpreted that language to require that a plan that provided lower 
benefits or charged more for the same benefits on the basis of age was a subterfuge unless the 
employer could show that the reduction in benefits was justified on the basis of age-related cost 
increases.  Thus, the employer was required to either provide equal benefits or incur equal costs for 
those benefits to older employees.42  
 This interpretation was resoundingly rejected by the United States Supreme Court in Public 
Employees Retirement System of Ohio v. Betts.43  The Court abruptly dismissed the EEOC’s 
regulations and ruled that the statutory prohibition on benefit plans that were a “subterfuge to 
evade the purposes of the Act” meant exactly what it said, using the common meaning of the word 
subterfuge: a “scheme, plan, stratagem, or artifice of evasion.”  That is, unless the employer 
specifically intended to provide a plan that evaded the intentions of the ADEA, the plan was not a 
subterfuge.  Since the plan at issue in Betts had been adopted prior to passage of the ADEA, the 
Court reasoned, it could not be a subterfuge to evade the purposes of the Act. 
AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT (ADEA) 
KEY NONDISCRIMINATION PROVISIONS: The ADEA prohibits employment discrimination against 
employees over the age of 40.  Benefit levels that impose disparate benefits on employees in this 
age group are permitted if the employer can show that the benefit disparities are cost-justified. 
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 Congress reacted swiftly and enacted the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act in 1990 to 
reverse the Supreme Court’s interpretation.  The reference to subterfuge was removed from the 
ADEA and replaced by a statutory provision that codified the equal cost/equal benefit rule 
developed by the EEOC in its regulations.  This provision was intended “to make clear that . . . the 
only justification for age discrimination in an employee benefit is the increased cost in providing the 
particular benefit to older individuals."44   
 It is not at all clear how this provision will be applied in the context of wellness programs.  
Age is inextricably linked with health and it is, in part, the aging of the workforce that has 
accelerated the increase in costs of ESHI.  A wellness program that requires satisfaction of a single 
biometric standard may be challenged on the grounds that the standard is discriminatory on the 
basis of age if it is unreasonably difficult for older employees to meet the standard.  And in many 
cases, even if an older employee meets the standard, the plan is still likely to incur more costs on 
behalf of that older employee.  May the employer adjust its incentive scheme on this basis, if it can 
show it is cost-justified?  These are issues that have not yet been addressed in the courts. 
 It is also important to note that even though the language of the ADA and the ACA are 
derived from the “subterfuge” language that originated in the ADEA, only the ADEA has been 
amended to remove that language.  Courts still rely on the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the 
subterfuge language in the Betts case (that is, there must be a deliberate intention to evade the 
statutory purposes) in ADA cases.45  It remains to be seen how courts will treat the same language 






 The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (“GINA”)46 protects employees 
from employment discrimination on the basis of their genetic information.  Unlike the ADA, which 
was enacted in the face of historic job discrimination on the basis of physical or mental disability, 
GINA was passed in light of the recent advances in genetic testing to head off the potential for 
discrimination in employment and health insurance coverage on the basis of an employer’s concern 
about an employee’s potential future bad health based on his genetic characteristics.47  The Act 
therefore generally prohibits employers and health plans from “request[ing] or requir[ing]”48 an 
individual to provide “genetic information” unless one of the statutory exceptions applies. 
GINA defines genetic information to include the medical history and results of genetic 
testing of an individual as well as his family members.  Under this definition, a family medical 
history, which is commonly requested as part of a health risk assessment, is protected under GINA.  
The regulations do permit a wellness program or health plan to request this information as part of a 
health risk assessment, but only if there is no reward or inducement offered and no penalty applied 
in connection with an employee’s decision to provide the genetic information or family medical 
history.49  In addition, the HRA cannot be completed prior to or in connection with enrollment in 
the employer’s ESHI plan.50 
Since employers frequently provide incentives to induce employees to complete HRAs, the 
GINA regulations impose a rather awkward bifurcation on the assessment process.  The wellness 
program must either provide a separate assessment without associated incentives or penalties, or it 
must present questions about family medical history in a separate section with a notice that 
GENETIC INFORMATION NONDISCRIMINATION ACT (GINA) 
KEY NONDISCRIMINATION PROVISIONS: An employer may not discriminate against individuals on 
the basis of information regarding their genetic health risks, and benefit levels may not vary on the 
basis of an individual’s genetic information or family medical history.  There is no exception for cost-
justified disparities.  
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informs employees that no incentive will be withheld or penalty applied if the employee fails to 
complete that section. (The same rules would apply if the health risk assessment requested 
information about other genetic information such as the results of genetic testing.)51 
Note that these rules apply only to permit a wellness program to request family medical 
history and other genetic information in connection with an assessment process.  The information 
gained from the assessment cannot be used under any circumstances to impose higher health plan 
costs. It can be used to develop wellness interventions and favorable health plan benefits for 
preventive care and disease management programs for the individual, but flexibility in plan design 
is restricted by regulations issued by the two agencies with enforcement authority under GINA, the 
EEOC and the Department of Labor. 
Under regulations promulgated by the EEOC, a plan that offers financial incentives or 
enhanced benefits applicable to individuals whose genetic information reveals a higher risk of 
developing a particular disease or condition must also offer the incentives or enhanced benefits to 
individuals who have manifested the condition. If, for example, a disease management program 
offers enhanced benefits or financial incentives to participate in a diabetes prevention program, the 
EEOC regulations require that the incentives and/or enhanced benefits must be offered to all 
individuals who have been diagnosed as having diabetes, as being at risk for diabetes due to 
lifestyle choices, or as being at risk based on genetic information.52   
Additional restrictions arise under Department of Labor regulations, which provide that 
enhanced benefits or financial incentives for participation in such a program may be provided to 
individuals identified as being at risk on the basis of genetic information only if those individuals 
initiate a request to participate in the intervention.53 
Summary Of Part II.  Taken together, these nondiscrimination laws prohibit discriminatory 
benefit levels established on the basis of race, ethnic origin, sex, age, disability, health status and 
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genetic health risks.  In the case of disability and age, disparate benefit levels may be permitted if 
the employer can show some cost justification for the disparities.  Since the health outcome goals 
established under a WWP and the incentives provided to induce achievement of those goals will 
bear directly on the benefit levels available to employees, they must be designed in a way that 
avoids violation of any of these prohibited types of discrimination.  In addition to these 
nondiscrimination provisions, there are limitations on the employer’s ability to require medical 
examinations and/or collect health information, including genetic information.  These provisions 
also will impact the design of the WWP.  Part III looks at common features of WWPs in light of these 
requirements. 
PART III: WORKSITE WELLNESS PROGRAM FEATURES 
 Overview. In order to avoid violation of the federal employment nondiscrimination 
statutes, WWPs must ensure that their outcome-based requirements to earn incentives do not 
intentionally or in practice discriminate on the basis of race, sex, ethnic origin, age, disability, health 
status and/or genetic information.  The first section in this Part III evaluates common biometrics 
and other WWP features to identify potentially discriminatory practices.  
 Since the statutes permit disparate benefit levels under some circumstances if the employer 
can show cost justification, the incentives will need to be proportional to the expected effectiveness 
of the incentives to impact health behaviors and the resulting cost savings to the employer.  The 
next two sections in this Part III report on the literature regarding (1) the likelihood that incentives 
will be effective in encouraging employees to adopt healthy behavior and lifestyle changes, and (2) 
the potential effect such changes will have on employer ESHI plan costs. 
 Potential for Disparate Impact.  This section examines some common features of 
outcome-based WWPs and evaluates the potential for creating prohibited discrimination under the 
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laws discussed above.  These features include certain common biometric readings and 
requirements for certain amounts or levels of physical activity.   
 Biometric readings.  Many outcome-based WWPs condition receipt of an incentive on 
obtaining one or more “normal” scores for blood pressure (120/80mmHg), BMI (< 25 kg/m2) 
and/or cholesterol (<200 mg/dL).  However, these markers are subject to significant variation 
among racial, gender and age groups, all of which are protected groups under the laws discussed in 
Part II.  This creates some risk that imposing the same standards on all groups will result in 
disparate impact on one or more of the protected groups. 
 BMI, for example, is an inexpensive, non-invasive method of determining a person’s 
variance from a normal weight.  The extent to which such variance impacts the person’s health, 
however, is frequently more a matter of adiposity than the mere weight-to-height ratio measured 
by BMI, and the relationship between BMI and adiposity varies significantly on the basis of age and 
sex: it underestimates adiposity in the elderly and overestimates it in men.54 
 Blood pressure and cholesterol levels tend to show racial and gender differences as well, 
with women more likely than men to score higher cholesterol levels,55 and non-Hispanic blacks 
more likely to exhibit high blood pressure than whites or Mexican Americans.56  Furthermore, as 
with the potential for a BMI measurement to over-simplify its impact on health risks, studies have 
shown that using blood pressure measurements at a single standard (140/90mmHg) to diagnose 
hypertension has resulted in “widespread diagnostic inaccuracies.”57  
 It also appears that the significance of the two elements of a blood pressure reading 
(systolic and diastolic readings) varies with age.  For individuals at or under 50 years of age, 
diastolic readings over 80 were found to be an important predictor of mortality, but not in older 
adults.  Conversely, for those over the age of 50, systolic readings at or over 140 had a significant 
impact on mortality.58   
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 It is apparent that these population-based disparities in the absolute values exhibited for 
these biometrics as well as the disparities in the potential health consequences they reflect may 
result in a disparate impact on protected groups.  However, the common value used for a particular 
biometric is, on its face, neutral as to each of these groups.  To avoid a disparate impact claim under 
Title VII, the employer should be prepared to show that application of the biometric standards does 
not result in unfavorable treatment among protected groups.  If there is concern that disparate 
impact may develop, it will probably be necessary to take a flexible, individualized approach to 
developing standards, as the use of standards explicitly based on sex or race may be considered 
facially discriminatory.    
 It is not clear how a challenge under the ADEA might fare.  Although the biometric 
standards are facially neutral with respect to age, each one becomes increasingly difficult to meet 
with advancing age.  This is precisely the reason the ADEA permits employers to provide disparate 
benefit levels on the basis of age.  If an employer has already established age-based disparate 
benefit levels (such as charging older employees higher premiums for its ESHI plan) using the 
justification that it is more expensive to insure older workers, then using an aggressive incentive 
structure to further increase benefit level disparities among its older workers might be considered 
“double dipping” and therefore impermissible under the ADEA. 
 It is also possible that establishing a required BMI level, blood pressure metric, or blood 
glucose level may encounter challenges under the ADA.  Although there have been no such 
challenges to date, these measures may be considered proxies for obesity, hypertension and 
diabetes, respectively, each of which can be a disability under the recent amendments to the ADA.  
If one of these measurements were recognized as a proxy for a disability, the employer would need 
to be able to show that incentives for reaching the measurement were based on underwriting risks 
or, if the EEOC were to challenge the practice, cost-justified. 
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 In addition, the biometric measurements themselves are likely to be considered “medical 
examinations” under the ADA and therefore, under the views of the EEOC, subject to its restrictions 
on voluntary medical examinations: rewards must not be of such significant value as to make 
participation “involuntary” and penalties are not permitted.  As noted in Part II, the only court to 
consider the meaning of a “voluntary medical examination” sidestepped this issue by looking 
instead at the permitted use of incentives as part of an underwriting risk under a bona fide health 
plan.  As a result, an employer who uses an aggressive incentive program may run the risk of a 
challenge by the EEOC.  Since the EEOC has not issued formal regulations (which have the force of 
law) and has published only its informal position (which does not), it is quite possible that the 
employer would win if it were to challenge the complaint in court.  The cost of such an undertaking 
may be prohibitively expensive, however.  
 Exercise Program Requirements.  It is common for WWPs to provide an incentive for 
employees to participate in a program of physical activity, such as walking five times a week for 30 
minutes.  If eligibility for incentives is not tied to performance goals (such as speed, strength, 
intensity or fitness biometrics), this program feature may be viewed as merely a participatory 
program.  For ACA purposes, it would not be subject to limits on the use of incentives.  If 
performance goals are established, it is possible that Title VII and/or  ADEA  liability might arise if 
the qualification criteria have an impermissible discriminatory impact, most likely on the basis of 
sex or age. 
 The ADA will also impose restrictions on a WWP exercise program feature, whether or not 
fitness goals are established. An alternative program must be developed for an employee who is 
physically disabled from participating in the required activity (or the requirement must be waived 
and the incentive paid without meeting the standard).  Note that the ACA might require a similar 
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accommodation if the employee can show that it is “medically unreasonable” for the disabled 
employee to meet the required standard. 
 The impact of other types of disabilities is less clear.  Consider the case of an employee who 
is affected by a visual disorder or neuromuscular complications that make walking possible, but 
unsafe to do so outside in uncontrolled conditions.  Under these circumstances, the ADA would 
probably require the employer to either accommodate the employee’s need for access to a gym or 
other facility that  would permit the employee to walk safely.  A case could be made that the ACA 
standards would also require that the employer provide a “reasonable alternative” even if the 
walking itself is not “medically unreasonable,” but application of this requirement has not been 
addressed by the courts.    
 This hypothetical situation should be contrasted with a lower income employee who lives in 
an unsafe neighborhood and is fearful of walking outdoors.  An accommodation for these unsafe 
conditions, while clearly a potential threat to health, is unlikely to be considered to be required 
under either the ADA or the ACA. 
 Effectiveness of Incentives.   Disparate benefit levels, if permitted at all under the federal 
nondiscrimination laws, require an employer to justify the disparity on the basis of costs. In order 
to show that incentives are cost-justified, there should be some reasonable relationship between 
the magnitude of the incentive and the magnitude of its effect on behavior.  However, as discussed 
below, there is no conclusive evidence that incentives are effective, and in any event it does not 
appear that there is a linear relationship between the size of the incentive and the expected change 
in behavior.  The discussion below reviews the literature concerning the effectiveness of incentives. 
 Health Risk Assessments.  Employers frequently use a health risk assessment as a gateway 
to further participation in a WWP.  Depending on the results of the assessment, an employee may 
be invited to participate in one or more interventions designed to improve his health risks, such as 
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physical exercise, nutrition counseling or smoking cessation programs.  In WWPs that include a 
disease management feature, an employee who is identified through an HRA as being at risk for 
cardiovascular disease or diabetes, for example, may become eligible for favorable preventive 
benefits under the employer’s ESHI plan.   
 The HRA is considered under many programs to be an essential first step and employers 
frequently provide financial and other incentives to employees to complete the HRA.  Recent 
research indicates that these incentives – at least when coupled with strong program 
communication and organizational support – do have a positive correlation with the response rate 
of employees asked to complete an HRA. This author notes, however, that the studies described 
below were funded by large commercial providers of employer-based health promotion programs. 
 In a cross-sectional study of 559,988 employees of 36 employers, the researchers found that 
employee response rates were positively associated with financial incentives.59 The study found 
that the value of the incentive and the strength of program communication significantly increased 
employee participation.  The study also found that response rates rose steadily with increasing 
incentive value from no incentive up to 100 dollars, but that there were diminishing returns for 
values greater than 100 dollars. 
Taitel, et al. found similar results in a cross-sectional study of 882,275 employees of 124 
different employers. The study found that the size of the incentive and the degree of organizational 
commitment and communication were significant predictors of employee response rates.60  While 
both factors had a positive impact on employees' responses, the factors were themselves inversely 
related: to achieve a stated response rate, an employer with strong communications and 
organizational commitment needed to provide an incentive valued at 40 dollars, whereas an 
employer with low communication and organizational commitment needed to provide an incentive 
valued at 120 dollars. 
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 Smoking Cessation Programs.  A recent Cochrane Database systematic review61 found that 
providing incentives for employees to quit smoking did not result in higher quit rates after six 
months.  The authors acknowledged that there was some evidence that participation rates in a 
cessation program may be improved by rewarding participation, and increased participation could 
lead to higher absolute numbers of employees who quit smoking.  However, the rewards did not 
improve results among those employees who chose to participate. The lack of differential between 
programs with incentives and those without was uniform across all 18 studies reviewed, with only 
one exception.  This randomized controlled trial is discussed immediately below. 
 Volpp et al.62 conducted a randomized control trial of 878 employees under a program that 
offered stepped incentives.  These included $100 for completion of a smoking cessation program, 
$250 for cessation of smoking within 6 months after enrollment in the program, and $400 for 
remaining abstinent for an additional 6 months.  Compliance was determined using biochemical 
tests.  They found that the group receiving the incentive had significantly higher quit rates at all 
testing points.  While not part of the study, the researchers noted that the relapse rate between the 
last test point and a 15- or 18-month assessment appeared to be considerably higher among the 
incentive group than rates in other published studies.   
 Weight Loss.  Financial incentives used in weight loss programs appear to be even less 
effective.  A systematic review of randomized controlled trials for treatment of overweight and 
obesity found no significant effect on weight loss or maintenance at 12 and 18 months.63  A 
randomized control trial conducted after the systematic review found that financial incentives 
induced significantly greater weight loss in the incentive group than controls at the conclusion of 
the program, but these differences were no longer significant during the maintenance phase 
(during which incentives were discontinued).64  One study has found that the use of financial 
incentives in diet and activity intervention actually undermined chances for success following 
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closure of the program: “across conditions, a main effect of financial motivation predicted a steeper 
rate of weight regained during the maintenance period.” 65 
 Summary. The evidence regarding the effectiveness of incentives is mixed at best, and does 
not seem to support use of incentives of the magnitude permitted under the ACA.  This would not 
be problematic if incentives were required to be provided as rewards to employees that result in 
additional cost to the employer.  Presumably an employer would not offer the maximum 
permissible incentive in the form of a cash reward if there was no evidence that the incentive would 
provide a return (in the form of reduced health costs) in excess of the cost of the incentive.  There is 
some concern, however, that an employer could structure the incentive in the form of a penalty that 
would require the employee to pay significantly higher healthcare costs without concern on the 
employer’s part about the cost-effectiveness of the incentive in terms of reduced health costs for 
the employer. 
 Cost Savings. To the extent an employer must justify an incentive program on the basis of 
cost, it may need to prove that the incentive program is effective to change behaviors and that those 
behaviors can be expected to result in reduced healthcare costs.  There can be little argument that a 
significant portion of any ESHI plan’s costs are attributable to the types of lifestyle and behaviors 
typically targeted by WWPs, such as smoking, overweight and lack of physical activity.  Studies have 
certainly shown that employees who smoke and/or are overweight tend to have higher medical 
costs. 
 A recent retroactive cohort study66 of medical claims costs during a 7-year review period 
showed that average annual medical care costs for smokers exceeded those of non-smokers by 
$1274.  Average annual claims costs for overweight and obese individuals exceeded those of normal 
weight by an amount ranging from $382 for the overweight (BMI >25 and < 30 kg/m2) to $5467 for 
the morbidly obese (BMI > 40 kg/m2).  However, the study did not control for changes in smoking 
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status or BMI, so these significant cost increases are not necessarily representative of the cost 
savings a health plan could expect if its WWP was successful in inducing smokers to quit and obese 
employees to reach a normal weight.  
 A few studies have examined the impact of these types of changes on medical costs.  In a 
large (n=10,601) 5-year retrospective study, Carls et al. found that employees who gained enough 
weight during the study period to move into the obese category (BMI > 30) kg/m2) experienced 
increased annual claims costs of $982 compared to those who remained below that threshold, but 
there was no significant difference in medical costs between those who remained in the obese 
category and those who lost enough weight during the study period to fall below the obese 
category.67  For this study at least, it appears that keeping employees from gaining weight is more 
cost effective than inducing them to lose weight.  A smaller study (n=279) similarly found no 
evidence of lower medical expenditures among individuals who lost at least five percent of their 
body weight.68   
 In a surprising outcome, the Carls study also found that employees who ceased using 
tobacco during the study period experienced significantly higher medical costs than those who did 
not.  The authors suggest that this counter-intuitive result may reflect the propensity of tobacco 
users to quit following a diagnosis of serious illness. 
 There have been scores of published studies examining the overall medical claims cost 
savings realized by employers that sponsor comprehensive WWPs.  Limitations of these studies are 
many: a lack of randomized control trials and biased results based on observational study design;69 
selection bias on the part of employees (the healthiest employees may be more likely to participate 
in voluntary wellness programs); publication bias (programs that do not show significant results 
are not selected for publication); the variability over time of employee participation in WWPs;70 
and difficulty in controlling for increasing medical care costs and an aging population over the 
course of the study.71 
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 Notwithstanding these limitations, this paper evaluates the magnitude of medical cost 
savings under these programs.  A quasi-systematic review of the literature was performed by 
reviewing seven systematic reviews of the cost effectiveness of WWPs.  These were used to 
generate a list of underlying studies. The systematic reviews are listed on Exhibit 1.    
 Studies were selected for evaluation if they had a publication date on or after 2000 and 
presented data for direct medical cost savings of WWPs in the United States.  There was significant 
overlap in the studies underlying the systematic reviews, resulting in a total of 12 studies that met 
the selection criteria for this paper.  References to these articles are listed on Exhibit 1.  Cost data 
were adjusted to represent 2012 values, using the US Medical Cost Inflation Factors 1935-2012, a 
component of the CPI-U index.  
A chart presenting summary findings from these 12 studies is shown on Exhibit 2.  The 
studies reveal a wide range of results, ranging from annual savings of $843 per employee to an 
annual cost increase of $311 per employee.  The mean savings was $358 per employee per year, 
and the median was $385 per employee per year.  Although researchers frequently recite an 
improvement in cost savings as a WWP matures, there was no apparent correlation between the 
length of the study period and the magnitude of savings.  Based on this data, however, it might be 
difficult for an employer to cost- justify incentives in the magnitude of $1950 to $3250 per year, as 
permitted by the ACA.  
 
PART IV: APPLICATION OF THE LAW AND THE SCIENCE TO WPP 
FEATURES 
 As Parts II and III have shown, the application of the federal employment discrimination 
laws to WWPs creates a patchwork of similar but inconsistent requirements for these programs, 
and the evidence of their effectiveness in improving health and reducing costs is similarly 
inconclusive.  At the same time, the popularity of WWPs and the use of incentives continue to grow, 
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and significant growth in the future is expected.72  This Part IV synthesizes the requirements of 
these laws and proposes a moderate or best practices approach to the use of incentives with 
respect to some of the most common WWP features.  In addition, the Compliance Guide that 
accompanies this paper provides a checklist of the various requirements and explains the legal 
basis for each requirement in layman’s terms.  More aggressive approaches than those suggested 
here may be possible, but they may lead to exposure to liability under one or more of these laws.   
 Health Risk Assessments – The suggested guidelines for HRAs depend on whether or not 
the instrument is likely to elicit genetic information or family medical histories:  
With genetic information or family medical history –  
 The HRA may not be presented to the employee prior to or in connection with 
enrollment in the employer’s ESHI plan. 
 If incentives are offered to complete the HRA, it should be organized in two parts, 
with one of those parts dedicated to questions expected to elicit genetic information, 
including family medical history.  Employees must be provided with notice that 
completion of this part is not required, and that the incentive will be awarded 
whether or not this part is completed.   
 If genetic information obtained from the HRA makes the employee eligible for 
enhanced benefits (such as incentives to participate in a disease 
management/prevention program), the same benefits must be provided to 
employees who are at risk of the same condition because of lifestyle or other factors, 
and to those who have already manifested the condition.  An employee who 
becomes eligible for the enhanced benefits due to genetic information must initiate 
a request to receive these benefits.  To meet these rules, the employer should 
develop communication materials describing the enhanced benefits and instructing 
the employee how to make a request.  A template for this notice is included in the 
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Compliance Guide.  The enhanced benefits should also be described in the ESHI plan 
summary so that employees who become eligible for the benefit because they have 
been diagnosed with or are otherwise at risk for the condition will be aware of the 
enhanced benefits.  However, it is not necessary for these employees to initiate a 
request for the benefits. 
Without genetic information or family medical history – 
 The completion of the HRA must be voluntary.  Incentives should be structured as 
rewards rather than as penalties. They should be proportional to the expected 
benefits of completing the HRA and consistent with underwriting practices.  In this 
regard, research indicates that incentives in excess of $100 show diminishing 
returns. 
 
 Biometric Standards –   
 Rigid, one-size-fits-all standards should be avoided.  One or more protected factors – 
race, sex, age, disability, and health status including genetic risk – may alone or in 
combination with other factors create the need for more flexibility in order to avoid 
prohibited discrimination. 
 Where the inability to meet a standard is unreasonably difficult due to a medical 
condition, or if it would be medically inadvisable for an employee to attempt to 
satisfy the standard, the employer must work with the employee to develop a 
reasonable alternative.  Employees must be informed of the availability of 
alternative standards under these circumstances. Model language for the notice is 
included in the Compliance Guide. 
 An employer that wishes to develop best practices should develop individualized, 
incremental goals based on maintaining or reducing current risk levels.  In this 
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regard, research indicates that maintaining or reducing current risk levels may 
produce greater healthcare cost savings than absolute changes in biometrics. 
 Incentives should be proportional to expected cost savings and consistent with 
underwriting practices.  In this regard, research does not conclusively support the 
premise that incentives induce long term changes in health behaviors. 
 To meet requirements under ADEA, employers must ensure that cumulative 
incentives when combined with other plan cost-sharing features do not exceed cost-
justification limits when applied to older employees. 
   
 Exercise Programs –  
 Programs that structure participation requirements in terms of amount or 
frequency of activity should be reasonable and consistent with established 
guidelines. The US Department of Health and Human Services recommends 30 
minutes of moderate exercise, five times per week is appropriate for health benefits. 
 Required types or intensity of exercise, including fitness or performance goals, 
should be individually tailored and/or based on incremental goals.   
 Incentives should be proportional to expected cost savings and consistent with 
underwriting practices.   
 Employers must ensure that cumulative incentives when combined with other plan 
cost-sharing features do not exceed cost-justification limits when applied to older 
employees. 
 Individual accommodations must be made for employees whose disability prevents 
or restricts participation in the program. 
 Similarly, reasonable alternatives must be developed for employees for whom it is 
unreasonably difficult to participate at the required level due to a medical condition, 
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or for whom it would be medically inadvisable to attempt to satisfy program 
requirements.  Employees must be informed of the availability of alternative 
standards under these circumstances. Model language for the notice is included in 
the Compliance Guide. 
 If particular classes are required, the employer must pay the cost of the classes. 
 
 Diet/Nutrition Programs – 
 If the program establishes weight loss or BMI standards, such standards should be 
individually tailored and focus on incremental goals.   
 Reasonable alternatives must be developed for employees for whom it is 
unreasonably difficult to meet a weight loss goal or BMI measurement due to a 
medical condition, or for whom it would be medically inadvisable to attempt to 
satisfy the standards.  Employees must be informed of the availability of alternative 
standards under these circumstances. Model language for the notice is included in 
the Compliance Guide. 
 Incentives should be proportional to expected cost savings and consistent with 
underwriting practices.   
 Employers must ensure that cumulative incentives when combined with other plan 
cost-sharing features do not exceed cost-justification limits when applied to older 
employees. 
 If participation in a particular program is required, the employer must pay the 
program costs.  The employer is not required to pay the costs of food.  
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PART V: CONCLUSION 
 While the ACA provisions allowing significant WWP incentives seem to evidence strong 
federal policy support for the idea that employees should be encouraged to adopt healthier 
lifestyles, it would be a mistake for employers to ignore the substantial body of federal law that 
protects employees from discrimination.  These laws collectively temper the employer’s ability to 
impose unreasonable and unattainable health standards on individual employees within a 
protected class.  This is particularly true in an environment where economic pressure on employers 
to provide affordable health care benefits will escalate in 2014 when the ACA employer mandates 
come into effect.   
 To date, it appears that most employers have used restraint in imposing or awarding 
incentives under their WWPs: indeed, in issuing the ACA Proposed Regulations, the Departments 
justified their lack of rigorous programmatic requirements on the evidence that employers 
currently offer incentives in the range of $152 to $557 per year – or just three to 11 percent of the 
cost of coverage: 
This suggests that companies typically are not close to reaching the 20 percent  … threshold 
[under the HIPAA regulations.] These findings indicate that based on currently available 
data, increasing the maximum reward for participating in a health-contingent wellness 
program to 30 percent … is unlikely to have a significant impact. 73 
 
 However, the Departments’ analysis did not evaluate the potential impact of the other ACA 
provisions that will come into effect at the same time as the WWP provisions.  In 2014, employers 
become subject to the mandate to provide health insurance to employees at affordable rates.  
Coupled with surveys that show employers intend to significantly increase their use of incentives 
for health-contingent outcomes – particularly in the form of penalties – it appears that many 
employers expect to become more aggressive in their WWP plan designs.74    
 Although the reach of the federal employment discrimination laws as applied to WWPs has 
not yet been tested, more aggressive plan designs are likely to draw closer scrutiny.   It is not clear 
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how sympathetic courts will be to claims of discrimination on this basis, but it would be prudent for 
employers to take a balanced approach to the use of incentives to further legitimate health goals by 
keeping incentives proportional to the anticipated benefits to be gained.   
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Comparative Changes in Direct Medical Costs under Comprehensive Worksite Wellness Programs 






























None ED, FC, HRA C 4 yrs ($225) 1999 ($372) 
Serxner, 2003 13,048 13,363 HRA, N, T, W C 4 yrs ($278) 
 
1997 ($492) 
Stave, 2003 1275 2687 N,PA,STR, T  C 4 yrs ($185) 2000 ($294) 
Aldana 2005 6246   C 6 yrs $0 2004 $0 
Long, 2007 142 142 T, W B 7 yrs ($285) 2003 ($398) 
Naydeck, 
2008 
1890 1890 STR, T, W B 1 yr  ($176)  2005 ($226) 
Mattke,2009 39,809 158962 No  details C 1 yr +$242 2005 +$311 
Milani, 2009 185 154 CNSL-gp and ind, 
ED,  FC ,HRA  
A 1 yr ($763) 2009  ($843) 
Yen, 2010 2036 154 ED, HRA C 8 yrs ($96) 2007 ($113) 
Henke, 2011 31823 31823 CNSL –ind, ED, 
ENV, FC, HRA, 
WEB 
B 7 yrs ($565) 2009 ($624) 
Hochart, 
2011 
9637 3800 CNSL – gp and ind, 
ED, HRA, WEB 
C 3 yrs ($588) 2008 $670 
Merrill, 2011 13790 5708 CNSL – gp, ED, 
HRA 
C 5 yrs ($505) 2008 $576 
1 Program Feature Key: CNSL-counseling, Gp – group, Ind – individual; ED – educational program; ENV –
environmental supports; FC –onsite fitness center; HRA – health risk assessment; N – nutrition; PA – physical 
activity; STR- stress management; T – tobacco cessation; W – weight management; WEB – web-based 
programs 
2 Study Design Key: A- Randomized control trial; B – Pre- and post-data with matched control group; C- 
observational, not matched control group 
3 PEPY – per employee per year 
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 With the ever escalating cost of health care in recent years, employers that offer employee 
medical benefits are increasingly turning to workplace wellness programs (WWPs) in an attempt to 
control costs. A large percentage of employers that offer these programs use incentives to encourage 
employee participation.  A 2012 survey by Towers Watson and the National Business Group on Health 
indicates that more than 70 percent of these plan sponsors use incentives to encourage employees to 
adopt healthier lifestyles, and a 2013 survey by Aon Hewitt reports that employers intend to increase 
their use of financial penalties for employees who fail to meet specified health standards. 
 The use of incentives to encourage participation in WWPs has been strongly endorsed by the 
Obama administration.  Among other things, the health care reform legislation enacted in 2010 (the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, or “ACA”) permits employers to offer significant incentives 
to employees who meet health standards established under their WWPs.  If the WWP meets the 
requirements imposed under the ACA, these incentives can be valued as high as 30 to 50 percent of the 
cost of medical coverage. With the cost of employee-only coverage estimated to reach $6000 by the 
time the new WWP rules come into effect in 2014, these incentives may reach a value of $1800 to 
$3000 annually (or higher if the cost of dependent coverage is considered.)   
 In November 2012, the federal government issued proposed rules establishing the requirements 
these programs must meet in order to be able to fully utilize the new incentive guidelines.  In addition to 
these requirements under the ACA, it is important for employers to understand that several other 
federal employment discrimination laws – including Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Genetic Information 
Nondiscrimination Act - impose additional requirements, many of which will temper the extent to which 
an employer may offer the full reward or impose the maximum penalty under the new ACA guidelines. 
 This Compliance Guide presents the combined requirements of these laws in a checklist format 
designed to help employers develop a WWP that complies with these sometimes conflicting and 
frequently overlapping requirements.  The checklist is embodied in the Table of Contents, which guides 
the reader to a fuller explanation of each requirement.  In addition, a Glossary of Federal Employment 
Discrimination Laws briefly describes the obligations imposed under each law.  Please note that there 
are many other federal as well as state laws that impact the design and operation of employee fringe 
benefit plans, including the federal Internal Revenue Code, the Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act and the Public Health Safety Act.  These and other laws are not considered or included in this Guide, 
which focuses exclusively on federal employment discrimination laws. 
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   The plan must be reasonably designed to promote health or prevent disease. 
   The plan must permit employees to qualify for the incentive at least once each year. 
   The plan must offer employees the opportunity to meet an alternative standard to 
qualify for the incentive if it is unreasonably difficult due to a medical condition, 
or if it would be medically inadvisable for an employee to attempt to satisfy the 
standard. 
   The employer must provide notice to employees that reasonable alternatives are 
available in all materials that describe the terms of the WWP program. 
   If the plan requires medical certification that the reasonable alternative is necessary 
due to an employee’s health status, the requirement must be applied consistently 






























   If the plan offers incentives for a program that is designed to prevent or reduce 
tobacco use, the total value of incentives offered under the WWP must not 
exceed 50 percent of the cost of coverage AND the value of the incentives offered 
for all programs except the tobacco use program must not exceed 30 percent. 
    If the plan does not offer incentives for a program that is designed to prevent or 
reduce tobacco use, the total value of incentives offered under the WWP must 


















   Incentives to complete an HRA should be structured as rewards.  Employees cannot be 
penalized for failure to take an HRA. 
   Incentives should be proportional to the benefits expected to be gained from the use 
of the HRAs, and consistent with underwriting practices.   
Genetic Information 
   Incentives cannot be offered – either as rewards or penalties – for completion of the 
part of an HRA that elicits genetic information or family medical history. 
  An HRA that includes questions about genetic information or family medical history 
cannot be provided to employees prior to or in connection with enrollment in the 
medical plan. 
   Any enhanced benefits offered to employees identified with genetic risk for a disease 
must be offered to all employees identified as being at risk for other reasons. 
  Employees who are identified as being at risk for genetic reasons must initiate the 



























   Avoid rigid, one-size-fits all standards.  Standards should be based on individualized, 
incremental goals based on maintaining or reducing current risk levels. 
  Incentives should be proportional to expected cost savings and consistent with 
underwriting practices. 
  The value of incentives and other cost differentials applicable to employees over the 
age of 40 under the employer’s health plan must not exceed the increased cost of 



















   If incentives are contingent on specified fitness or performance goals, standards 
should be based on individualized, incremental goals. 
   If incentives are contingent on completing a specified amount or frequency of 
exercise, standards should be reasonable and consistent with established 
guidelines. 
  Employees with disabilities must be provided reasonable accommodations where 
appropriate. 
  Incentives should be proportional to expected cost savings and consistent with 
underwriting practices. 
  The value of incentives and other cost differentials applicable to employees over the 
age of 40 under the employer’s health plan must not exceed the increased cost of 




















   If incentives are contingent on specified weight, adiposity or BMI measurements, 
standards should be based on individualized, incremental goals. 
  Incentives should be proportional to expected cost savings and consistent with 
underwriting practices. 
   If the WWP offers a reasonable alternative standard that consists of attending or 
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RULES APPLICABLE TO ANY PLAN THAT OFFERS INCENTIVES TO ATTAIN A HEALTH OUTCOME: 
PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS 
   The plan must be 
reasonably designed to 
promote health or 
prevent disease. 
Well-designed Worksite Wellness Programs (WWPs) focus on programs designed to 
encourage employees (and dependents, where applicable) to change their health habits 
in order to improve their health risks.  Programs frequently target:  
Tobacco cessation.  The CDC offers a free tobacco cessation program at 
http://www.smokefree.gov/  
Weight loss, diet and nutrition.  The CDC has developed a program for healthy 
eating and weight loss at the worksite.  Step-by-step instructions for developing 
the program are at http://www.cdc.gov/leanworks/  
Physical inactivity.  A tool kit for developing a physical activity component is 
available from the CDC at 
http://www.cdc.gov/nccdphp/dnpao/hwi/toolkits/pa-toolkit.htm.  
Stress reduction.    
Additional toolkits are available at: 
http://www.cdc.gov/nccdphp/dnpao/hwi/toolkits/index.htm#General  
Some WWPs will also include disease management programs within the employee’s 
medical benefits plan. These programs provide clinical and educational support to 
employees who have been diagnosed with or are at risk for a disease or condition, with 
a view to reducing or preventing escalation in the severity of the condition. 
To be successful, a  WWP requires strong organizational support and commitment from 
all levels of management.  This will include: 
Support at the top levels of management 
A champion at the worksite to promote the program 
A commitment to soliciting employee input and feedback on the program 
Tailoring programs to the cultural and linguistic needs of each employee 
population 
The CDC offers a comprehensive guide to developing a well-designed WWP at 
http://www.cdc.gov/dhdsp/pubs/docs/HSC_Manual.pdf.  This HealthScoreCard lists the 
most effective WWP practices and ranks them on the basis of their impact level and the 
degree of scientific evidence supporting their effectiveness.  The HealthScoreCard can 
help you design a new program that will meet the ACA requirement to be reasonably 
designed to promote health or prevent disease.  It also serves as a convenient tool to 
track the development of an organization’s WWP over time. 
 




RULES APPLICABLE TO ANY PLAN THAT OFFERS INCENTIVES TO ATTAIN A HEALTH OUTCOME: 
PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS 
   The plan must permit 
employees to qualify for 
the incentive at least once 
each year. 
Under the ACA rules, the WWP must allow employees to qualify for incentives at least 
once each year.  For example, if the WWP requires an employee to be tobacco-free for 
12 months in order to qualify, the employee must have a chance at least once each 
year to show that he or she has met the standard. 
   The plan must offer 
employees the 
opportunity to meet an 
alternative standard to 
qualify for the incentive if 
it is unreasonably difficult 
due to a medical 
condition, or if it would be 
medically inadvisable for 
an employee to attempt 
to satisfy the standard. 
The ACA requires the plan to work with employees to develop alternative standards to 
qualify for an incentive if the employee’s medical condition makes it unreasonably 
difficult or inadvisable to meet the general standard. Alternatively, the plan may waive 
the standard and allow the employee to obtain the reward or avoid the penalty, as 
applicable.  Reasonable alternative standards are subject to these additional 
requirements: 
  The reasonable alternative should be developed in light of all the facts and 
circumstances applicable to the employee.  This means that many times the 
reasonable alternative cannot be established in advance. 
   If the reasonable alternative standard requires completion of an educational 
program, the plan must make the program available to the employee and pay the 
cost of the program.  It is not considered reasonable to make the employee find a 
program without assistance from the plan. 
   If the alternative requires an employee to comply with the recommendations of a 
health care professional engaged by the employer or the plan, the WWP must 
accommodate the recommendations of the employee’s health care provider if the 
provider states that the plan-provided recommendations are not medically 
appropriate for the employee. 
 
   The employer must 
provide notice to 
employees that 
reasonable alternatives 
are available in all 
materials that describe 
the terms of the WWP 
program.   
The following language has been developed by the Department of Labor as model 
language for inclusion in plan materials that describe the WWP program. Employers are 
free to develop their own language if they prefer: 
“Your health plan is committed to helping you achieve your best health status. 
Rewards for participating in a wellness program are available to all employees.  If you 
think you might be unable to meet a standard for a reward under this wellness 
program, you might qualify for an opportunity to earn the same reward by different 
means.  Contact us at [insert contact information] and we will work with you to find a 
wellness program that is right for you in light of your health status.” 
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RULES APPLICABLE TO ANY PLAN THAT OFFERS INCENTIVES TO ATTAIN A HEALTH OUTCOME: 
PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS 
   If the plan requires 
medical certification that 
the reasonable alternative 
is necessary due to an 
employee’s health status, 
the requirement must be 
applied consistently to all 
similarly situated 
employees in a 
nondiscriminatory 
manner. 
If it is reasonable under the circumstances, the ACA permits the plan to require an 
employee to provide verification that a health factor makes it unreasonably difficult or 
medically inadvisable to attain the required standard.  This may include a statement 
from the employee’s personal physician.  It will not be considered reasonable to require 
this verification if the medical condition of the employee is known to the plan and the 
employee’s request for a reasonable alternative is obviously valid.   
Under the ADA and GINA, the employer should not be permitted access to the medical 
or health reason(s) for which the reasonable alternative is requested and/or approved.   
The requirement to provide verification should be applied consistently and in a 
nondiscriminatory manner to all similarly situated employees. 
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RULES APPLICABLE TO ANY PLAN THAT OFFERS INCENTIVES TO ATTAIN A HEALTH OUTCOME: 
MAXIMUM PERMISSIBLE INCENTIVES 
   If the plan offers 
incentives for a program 
that is designed to 
prevent or reduce tobacco 
use, the total value of 
incentives offered under 
the WWP must not exceed 
50 percent of the cost of 
coverage AND the value of 
the incentives offered for 
all programs except the 
tobacco use program must 
not exceed 30 percent. 
 
The ACA allows plans to offer incentives for up to 30 percent of the cost of coverage 
under the employer’s medical plan.  This total can increase if the WWP includes a 
program that targets tobacco use.  In that case, the total value of incentives can be as 
high as 50 percent of the cost of coverage, provided the cumulative value of incentives 
for the WWP programs other than the tobacco use program does not exceed 30 
percent.   
The “cost of coverage” means the total cost of coverage for an employee (and 
dependents, where applicable) and includes both the portion paid by the employer and 
the employee’s required contribution.  If dependents can qualify for the incentives, the 
cost of coverage will be determined on the basis of the type of dependent coverage in 
which the employee is enrolled. For simplicity, this Compliance Guide refers only to 
employee coverage, but all principles would apply to WWPs that offer dependent 
coverage as well. 
For example, if the cost of employee-only coverage is $6000 per year, the total value of 
incentives for all WWP programs (including the tobacco use program) can be as high as 
$3000 (50% of $6000), as long as the incentives for programs other than tobacco use do 
not exceed $1800 (30% of $6000). 
CAUTIONARY NOTE: A WWP MAY MEET THE ACA STANDARDS FOR THE MAXIMUM 
INCENTIVE AMOUNT, BUT OTHER LAWS MAY LIMIT INCENTIVES TO AN AMOUNT 
THAT IS PROPORTIONAL TO EXPECTED BENEFITS AND CONSISTENT WITH 
UNDERWRITING PRACTICES.  THESE ARE OUTLINED IN OTHER SECTIONS OF THIS 
GUIDE. 
   If the plan does not 
offer incentives for a 
program that is designed 
to prevent or reduce 
tobacco use, the total 
value of incentives offered 
under the WWP must not 
exceed 30 percent of the 
cost of coverage. 
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  RULES APPLICABLE TO A PLAN THAT USES HEALTH RISK ASSESSMENTS: 
INCENTIVES 
A Health Risk Assessment or HRA is a survey of an employee’s health behaviors and risk 
factors.  The assessment may include biometric measurements as well as questions 
about lifestyle and behaviors.  Once the employee completes the assessment, the 
answers are evaluated to determine areas of health risk and the employee is provided 
feedback that includes information about how changing lifestyle or behaviors may 
reduce the risk.  This feedback, in conjunction with the other programs made available 
through the WWP, can be instrumental in effecting behavior changes in employees. 
State and federal privacy laws generally prohibit employers from having access to the 
information an employee reports on a health risk assessment.  Employers will typically 
use a health risk assessment tool provided by their health benefits plan provider or 
other outside consultants.  The vendor can provide aggregate data from all employee 
responses, but cannot provide individualized data. 
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) prohibits an employer from requiring an 
employee (whether or not disabled) to take medical examinations.  (There are some 
exceptions, but they do not apply to HRAs.) Since the HRA is considered to be a medical 
examination, the ADA limits the use of HRAs. 
These limits are not entirely clear because the EEOC, the agency responsible for 
establishing guidelines, has not issued regulations.  Until more guidance is available, 
this Guide recommends a conservative approach by limiting incentives to amounts 
proportional to the benefits expected to be gained from the use of HRAs and consistent 
with underwriting practices.  That is, the incentives should not be larger than 
reasonably necessary to encourage employees to complete the HRA or out of 
proportion to any cost savings expected to be realized by increasing employee 
participation.  In this regard, the research indicates that incentives of approximately 
$100 are effective to encourage participation, but incentives in excess of that amount 




If the plan offers 
incentives to complete the 
HRA: 
   Incentives should be 
structured as rewards.  
Employees cannot be 
penalized for failure to 
take an HRA. 
  Keep incentives 
proportional to the 
benefits expected to be 
gained from the use of the 
HRAs, and consistent with 
underwriting practices.   
 
 




RULES APPLICABLE TO A PLAN THAT USES HEALTH RISK ASSESSMENTS: 
GENETIC INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS 
If the HRA elicits genetic 
information or family 
medical history: 
   Incentives cannot be 
offered – either as 
rewards or penalties – for 
completion of the part of 
the HRA that elicits 
genetic information or 
family medical history. 
  An HRA that includes 
questions about genetic 
information or family 
medical history cannot be 
provided to employees 
prior to or in connection 





The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) generally prohibits an employer 
from discriminating against employees and their dependents on the basis of their 
genetic information.    
Under GINA, genetic information includes the results of genetic testing of an individual 
as well as his family medical history.  The GINA rules impact WWPs that use health risk 
assessments because these assessments frequently ask questions about an employee’s 
individual genetic health risks, particularly in connection with family medical history. 
Under GINA, employees cannot be given a reward or a penalty for refusing to complete 
any HRA questions that might reasonably be expected to elicit genetic information or 
family medical history.  If incentives are offered for completion of the HRA in general, 
the following additional requirements must be met: 
  The HRA instrument must be divided into two distinct documents.   
   The portion of the HRA that does not ask for genetic information should clearly 
state that an employee should NOT provide any genetic information.  The following 
language can be used: 
In answering these questions, please do not include any genetic information.  
That is, do not include any family medical history or any information that is 
related to genetic testing, genetic services, genetic counseling or genetic 
disease for which you believe you may be at risk. 
  The portion of the HRA that asks for genetic information or family medical history 
must include clear instructions that inform the employee that any incentive provided 
for completion of the first part of the HRA (which does not ask for genetic 
information or family medical history) will be provided whether or not the employee 
completes the HRA that asks for genetic information or family medical history. 
In addition, GINA provides that employees cannot be required to complete any health 
risk assessment questions about genetic information or family medical history as a 
requirement to enroll in the employer’s medical plan.  An HRA that includes questions 
about this information cannot be provided to employees prior to or in connection with 
enrollment in the medical plan. 
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RULES APPLICABLE TO A PLAN THAT USES HEALTH RISK ASSESSMENTS: 
GENETIC INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS 
If the plan offers 
enhanced benefits to 
employees who are 
identified as having a 
genetic risk of developing 
disease, the plan must 
meet these requirements: 
   Enhanced benefits 
must be offered to all 
employees identified as 
being at risk for the 
disease or condition, not 
just to those with genetic 
risks. 
  Employees who are 
identified as being at risk 
for genetic reasons must 





The WWP or a disease management component of an employer’s medical plan may 
offer enhanced benefits designed to encourage employees at risk of developing a 
disease to change their health behaviors.  For example, a plan might waive copays for 
generic blood pressure medications to encourage employees to adhere to a prescribed 
medication schedule in order to reduce the risk of cardiovascular disease.   The plan 
may also provide education and counseling support to help employees change their 
lifestyle behaviors with respect to this condition.  
If the plan offers these enhanced benefits, benefits cannot be restricted to employees 
who are identified as being at genetic risk for developing the disease.  Other employees 
who have been diagnosed with the disease or those who are at risk of developing it due 
to various risk factors (such as weight and other biometric measurements) must also be 
eligible for the enhanced benefits. 
In addition, employees who are identified as eligible for the enhanced benefits because 
of their genetic information must initiate the request for the enhanced benefits.  The 
employer and the plan are not permitted to initiate enrollment in the program.   
The employee can be notified of the availability of the program and given information 
about how to enroll. The program should also be described in the plan summary so that 
other employees (those who are already diagnosed with the disease or are otherwise at 
risk) know of its availability.   
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RULES APPLICABLE TO PLANS THAT OFFER INCENTIVES TO ATTAIN BIOMETRIC STANDARDS  
 
Some WWPs make receipt of incentives contingent on an employee attaining or 
maintaining specified biometric standards such as weight, BMI, blood pressure and/or 
cholesterol levels.  Title VII, ADEA and the ADA all protect employees from 
discrimination in fringe benefits on the basis of sex, race, ethnic origin, age and 
disability.  Applying these biometric standards on a rigid, one-size-fits-all basis can 
result in prohibited discrimination against one or more of these groups of protected 
employees.   
In addition, some of these statutes require an employer to be able to show that 
standards that result in harsher treatment of a protected group must be justified by 
showing that the differences are a reasonable result based on the cost of providing 
benefits or accepted underwriting practices.   
For example, the ADEA protects employees over the age of 40 and requires employers 
to show that age-based differences in benefits are justified by proving the increased 
cost of providing benefits to older employees.  Incentives offered under a WWP should 
be aggregated with any increased costs under the medical plan (such as employee 
contribution levels) which are passed through to older employees, so that the total 
difference in benefits is justified. 
To avoid claims of discriminatory treatment, standards for incentives should be based 
on individualized, incremental goals, and the value of incentives should be proportional 
to expected cost savings and consistent with underwriting practices.  In this regard, 
research indicates that maintaining or reducing an employee’s current risk levels may 
produce greater healthcare cost savings than absolute changes in biometrics.  Research 
does not conclusively support the premise that incentives induce long term changes in 
health behaviors. 
The general rules about providing reasonable alternative standards and the required 
notices will also apply.  See the discussion at “Rules Applicable to Plans that Offer 
Incentives to Attain a Health Outcome: Program Requirements.” 
 
   Avoid rigid, one-size-
fits all standards.  
Standards should be 
based on individualized, 
incremental goals based 
on maintaining or 
reducing current risk 
levels. 
 
  Incentives should be 
proportional to expected 




  The value of incentives 
and other cost 
differentials applicable to 
employees over the age of 
40 under the employer’s 
health plan must not 
exceed the increased cost 
of providing benefits to 
this group.  
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RULES APPLICABLE TO PLANS THAT OFFER INCENTIVES TO PARTICIPATE IN A PHYSICAL 
ACTIVITY PROGRAM  
   If incentives are 
contingent on specified 
fitness or performance 
goals, standards should be 
based on individualized, 
incremental goals. 
 
   If incentives are 
contingent on completing 
a specified amount or 
frequency of exercise, 
standards should be 




  Employees with 





  Incentives should be 
proportional to expected 




  The value of incentives 
and other cost 
differentials applicable to 
employees over the age of 
40 under the employer’s 
health plan must not 
exceed the increased cost 
of providing benefits to 
this group.  
Many WWPs offer incentives to employees who participate in a physical fitness 
program for a specified number of hours or frequency during the week.  Other 
programs may require certain types of exercise or establish minimum intensity or 
distance standards, or require that employees meet certain performance goals.   
These standards, like the biometric standards described above, can have a 
discriminatory effect if applied on a rigid basis to all employees without regard to their 
age, sex or possible disabilities.  To the extent that the program requires specific types 
of exercise, level of intensity, or fitness or performance goals, incentives should be 
individually tailored and/or based on incremental goals in order to avoid discrimination 
claims.  Programs that structure participation requirements in terms of amount or 
frequency of activity should be reasonable and consistent with established guidelines. 
The US Department of Health and Human Services recommends 30 minutes of 
moderate exercise, five times per week as appropriate for health benefits.  
In addition to setting program goals on an individualized basis, employees who are 
disabled within the meaning of the ADA may require special accommodations to 
participate in an exercise program.  Individual accommodations must be made for 
employees whose disability prevents or restricts access to or participation in the 
program.   
To meet any cost-justification requirements, incentives should be proportional to 
expected cost savings and consistent with underwriting practices.   
The general rules about providing reasonable alternative standards and the required 
notices will also apply.  See the discussion at “Rules Applicable to Plans that Offer 
Incentives to Attain a Health Outcome: Program Requirements.”  
Similarly, the ADEA rules for cost justification discussed above in connection with 
Biometric Standards may apply. 
Finally, if particular classes are required, the employer must pay the cost of the classes. 
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  RULES APPLICABLE TO PLANS THAT OFFER INCENTIVES TO PARTICIPATE IN A DIET, 
NUTRITION OR WEIGHT LOSS PROGRAM 
 
 
   If incentives are 
contingent on specified 
weight, adiposity or BMI, 




  Incentives should be 
proportional to expected 




   If the WWP offers a 
reasonable alternative 
standard that consists of 
attending or completing a 
weight loss program, the 
employer must pay the 




Many WWPs offer incentives to employees who participate in weight loss or nutrition 
programs.  If the WWP provides incentives merely to attend nutrition education classes 
or motivational meetings, without any associated weight loss requirements, the 
programs generally are not subject to limits on incentives.  They must be offered in a 
nondiscriminatory manner to similarly situated employees, but are not otherwise 
subject to strict requirements.  However, if these classes are offered as a reasonable 
alternative to a weight loss program as discussed below, the employer must pay for the 
required classes.   
If the WWP establishes weight, adiposity or BMI standards to qualify for incentives, 
these standards, like the biometric standards previously discussed, can have a 
discriminatory effect if applied on a rigid basis to all employees without regard to their 
age, sex or possible disabilities.  To avoid discrimination claims, incentives should be 
individually tailored and/or based on incremental goals.   
To meet any cost-justification requirements imposed under the employment 
discrimination laws, incentives should be proportional to expected cost savings and 
consistent with underwriting practices.  In this regard, research indicates that 
incentives may promote short term weight loss but does not support the premise that 
incentives are effective to achieve or maintain weight loss on a long term basis. 
The general rules about providing reasonable alternative standards and the required 
notices will also apply.  See the discussion at “Rules Applicable to Plans that Offer 
Incentives to Attain a Health Outcome: Program Requirements.” If the reasonable 
alternative standard is to attend a weight loss program, the employer must pay for the 
cost of the classes (but not for the cost of food). 
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GLOSSARY OF FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 
ACA – The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010.  This statute continues the provisions 
which were originally established under HIPAA to protect against discrimination in health insurance on 
the basis of health factors such as pre-existing conditions, physical and mental health status, medical 
claims costs, etc.  It also continues and expands HIPAA’s permissible use of incentives to encourage 
employees to participate in worksite wellness programs (WWPs).  The ACA imposes requirements on the 
terms and conditions of WWPs so that the incentives cannot be used to avoid other provisions of the 
ACA which prohibit employers from charging an employee a higher premium or provide lower medical 
benefits on the basis of his or her health factors.  The ACA rules include limits on the maximum amount 
of incentives that can be offered and requirements that: the WWP must be reasonably designed to 
promote health or prevent disease; employees must be given an opportunity to qualify for incentives at 
least once a year;  and the WWP must allow employees to qualify for the incentives  under a reasonable 
alternative if it is unreasonably difficult for an employee to participate at the required level due to a 
medical condition, or for whom it would be medically inadvisable to attempt to satisfy program 
requirements. 
ADA – The Americans with Disabilities Act.  The ADA protects disabled employees from employment 
discrimination, including discrimination in fringe benefits such as a WWP or employer-sponsored 
medical plan.  The ADA limits the employer’s rights to require employees (whether disabled or not) from 
undergoing medical examinations that are not job-related and necessary for business purposes.  This 
impacts the extent to which WWPs can offer incentives for health risk assessments (which are 
considered to be medical examinations) and require that employees meet biometric standards (since 
taking the biometric measurement is a medical examination.)  In addition, the ADA requires employers 
to make reasonable accommodations for disabled employees so that they will have the same 
opportunity to earn incentives.  Although the general rules under the ADA prohibit an employer from 
discriminating on the basis of disability under its employee benefit programs, an exception to the 
general rule allows employer-sponsored health plans to make benefit distinctions on the basis of 
disability if the distinctions are cost-justified and/or consistent with underwriting practices.   
ADEA – The Age Discrimination in Employment Act.  The ADEA protects employees over the age of 40 
from job discrimination, which generally includes discrimination in fringe benefits.  However, the ADEA 
allows an employer to provide reduced benefits, or to charge older employees more for the same 
benefits, if the employer can show that the reduction in benefits or higher charge is justified on the 
basis of the employer’s higher costs for providing these benefits to an older employee.  The incentives 
payable under a WWP will be subject to the same rules.   
GINA – The Genetic Information and Nondiscrimination Act.  GINA prohibits employers from 
discriminating against employees on the basis of their genetic health information.  Genetic information 
is defined to include, among other things, the results of genetic testing for the employee and his family 
members.  An employee’s genetic information includes his family medical history.  An employer may not 
require an employee to provide genetic information, and it cannot provide incentives to encourage the 
employee to provide it.  Also, to make sure that the employer does not use genetic information in 
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establishing medical benefits or premiums, the employer may not ask the employee to provide genetic 
information at any time prior to or in connection with enrollment in the medical plan.   
Title VII – Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.  Title VII prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of 
sex, race, religion or ethnic origin, including discrimination in fringe benefits.  If benefits under a WWP 
or medical plan are found to be less favorable for – or if penalties are harsher when applied to – 
employees on this basis, the employer will be considered in violation of Title VII. 
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